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INTRODUCTION**
In July 2017, the Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
announced that LIBOR, the London Interbank Offer Rate, will not be supported 
after the end of 2021.1 The severity of this decision is expressed through the 
fact that LIBOR was once hailed as the “world’s most important number” and 
justifiably so as it served as a reference rate in an estimated total of $400 trillion 
assets globally in 2019.2 Market participants were told they had to find a re-
placement for LIBOR within four years, but they were not given any specificity 
on how the amendment process should work or what rate it should be replaced 
with.  There is no exact substitute rate for LIBOR, so any contract amendment 
for a replacement rate must be accompanied by losses; the decision to determine 
who compensates for this change in value has been delegated to the market par-
ticipants to figure out themselves.3 Most contracts referencing LIBOR did not 
consider that the phaseout of the world’s most important number would be a 
possibility, and as a result most of the fallback language in these contracts are 
ambiguous and largely ineffective for parties to rely on when making decisions 
for a new rate term.4 A mandated path for how parties must replace LIBOR in 
legacy contracts has yet to be enacted with a little over a year left until the 
phaseout deadline, and Michael Held, executive vice president and general 
counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, characterizes this reality as 
** On Monday, November 30, 2020, U.S. and U.K. regulators and LIBOR’s administrator 
made a collection of announcements that proposed the possibility of a new endgame for USD 
LIBOR. Specifically, the ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA) announced that it will open a con-
sultation on its intention to cease the publication of LIBOR settings. In its new proposed plan, the 
IBA would extend posting the USD overnight, 1M, 3M, 6M, and 12M LIBOR until June 30, 2023.  
Despite the IBA in its announcement stating that “[t]his consultation is not, and must not be taken to 
be, an announcement that IBA will cease or continue the provision of any LIBOR setting after De-
cember 31, 2021,” the market is treating the extension as close to a near certainty given the en-
dorsement the extension has received from the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC), the 
US regulators, and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The consultation is open for feedback 
until January 25, 2021. The author of Note would like to express that if the extension is confirmed 
and finalized, all contracts that end prior to June 30, 2023 would not need to be amended or renego-
tiated. Only legacy contracts that extend beyond June 30, 2023 would need to be amended and par-
ties need to determine a new rate accordingly. However, the exact timeline for the reference date 
will not be finalized until after this Note is published. See ALT. REFERENCE RATES COMM., GUIDE 
ON THE ENDGAME FOR USD LIBOR, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files
/2020/ARRC_Endgame_USD_LIBOR.pdf.
1. See Andrew Bailey, The Future of LIBOR, Speech, 27 July 2017, 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/the-future-of-LIBOR.
2. Replacing LIBOR – the World’s Most Important Number, J.P. MORGAN (May 2020), 
https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/gl/en/insights/investing/replacing-LIBOR-the-worlds-most-
important-number.
3. See Hanif Virji et al., Facing the End of LIBOR: The Financial and Legal Implications,
BUTTERWORTHS J. OF INT’L. BANKING AND FIN. L. (2019).
4. ALT. REFERENCE RATES COMM., SECOND REPORT (2018) [hereinafter SECOND ARRC
REPORT], https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2018/ARRC-Second-
report.
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a “DEFCON 1 litigation event if I’ve ever seen one.”5
This paper will explore the different steps market participants should take to 
make sure they are prepared when LIBOR is phased out in December 2021.  
Part I will focus on the actions market participants should do before going into 
negotiations that can increase their potential to reach a consensual agreement.  
Part II will explore what financial firms should be prepared for during the nego-
tiation process and what claims may arise when no agreement is reached.  The 
decision for how to handle any LIBOR-linked financial instrument in their port-
folio should be left to the discretion of market participants themselves.  This 
paper does not set out to make that decision, but it will communicate the urgen-
cy with which firms should act to either reach a consensual agreement or pre-
pare for the legal risk and litigation costs of DEFCON 1.
I. PREPARING FOR NEGOTIATIONS: IDENTIFICATION/DRAFTING
Market participants need to identify and implement a plan for how they will 
deal with the risk presented from the phaseout of LIBOR.6 Although there was 
early speculation about dialogue between the ICE Benchmark Administration 
(IBA) and panel banks to see if a significant number would continue to provide 
LIBOR estimates after December 2021, the notion of a LIBOR extension has 
been publicly dismissed by the Federal Reserve Board and the FCA.7 The FCA 
has intervened to preserve LIBOR’s stability only through the end of 2021, and 
Vice Chair for Supervision of the Federal Reserve Board Randal Quarles ad-
dressed this point warning financial institutions that “it is [now] a matter of how 
LIBOR will end rather than if it will end.”8 Quarles expanded on this point to 
make financial institutions aware that the Federal Reserve fully expects to see 
an appropriate level of preparedness at the banks they supervise, and that as the 
end of 2021 grows closer so will the Fed’s expectations in regards to firm pre-
paredness to handle this issue.9 As to questions of whether COVID-19 will de-
lay the phaseout deadline, the FCA announced that, together with the Bank of 
England and members of the Working Group on Sterling Risk-Free Reference 
Rates, it continues “to monitor and assess the impact on transition timelines, 
and will update the market as soon as possible” while confirming that “[t]he 
central assumption that firms cannot rely on LIBOR being published after the 
5. See Michael Held, SOFR and the Transition from LIBOR, BIS (Feb. 2019), 
https://www.bis.org/review/r190318f.htm.
6. See generally DELOITTE U.K., LIBOR TRANSITION: SETTING YOUR FIRM UP
FOR SUCCESS (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-
services/deloitte-uk-LIBOR-transition-ibor-benchmark-report-digital.pdf.
7. See generally LIBOR Litigation Risks: Securitization and Market Legacy Vehicles and 
Instruments, SFA, 12 (Dec. 2019), https://structuredfinance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/SFA-
Libor-Litigation-Risks.pdf.
8. Randal K. Quarles, The Next Stage in the LIBOR Transition, Speech, Federal Reserve 
Board (June 3, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/quarles20190603a.htm.
9. Id.
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end of 2021 has not changed and should remain the target date for all firms to 
meet.”10 LIBOR is ending, and firms should be actively working to make sure 
that they are putting together a plan to deal with repercussions of the LIBOR 
phaseout if they have not already done so.11
The expected discontinuation of LIBOR presents an active risk to public 
companies, investment advisers, investment companies, and broker-dealers.12
As such, the SEC released a statement on LIBOR transition in July 2019 ex-
plaining that the risks associated with the discontinuation of LIBOR will be ex-
acerbated if the work necessary to effect an orderly transition to an alternative 
rate is not completed in a timely manner.13 The Commission encouraged mar-
ket participants back in 2019 to begin the process of identifying any legacy con-
tract that contains interest rate provisions referenced to LIBOR that did not con-
template the permanent discontinuation of LIBOR when drafted.14 When a firm 
takes inventory, it is important to not limit the inquiry to third-party debt in-
struments; intercompany loans, long-term leases, and procurement contracts 
may also have a LIBOR component that needs to be adjusted.15 The Commis-
sion has laid out a template of questions to help guide firms on where they 
should focus their attention in their determination for the risks they face during 
this transitionary period.16 The list of questions does not purport to cover all 
potential risks, but it does highlight some key areas to focus on.  As a minimum 
standard, investigations should yield results that determine precisely: the specif-
ic language used for fallback provisions, the type of financial instrument being 
used in the legacy contract, and the alternative rate necessary to satisfy the par-
ties involved in the contract.
A. What Specific Language is Used for Fallback Provisions?
Due to liquidity, LIBOR became the dominant USD reference rate used in a 
wide array of cash instruments beyond syndicated loans, including corporate 
loans, floating rate notes, securitizations, and consumer mortgages.17  Transi-
tioning away from LIBOR in legacy contracts involving these financial instru-
10. Impact of the Coronavirus on firms’ LIBOR transition plans, FCA (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/impact-coronavirus-firms-libor-transition-plans.
11. LIBOR – Act now on replacement, PWC (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.pwc.com/us/en
/cfodirect/publications/in-the-loop/LIBOR-replacement.html (“All companies – regardless of the 
size of their LIBOR exposure or industry – need to act now”).




15. See Chalyse Robinson & Nathan J. Moore, Prepare Your Business for the End of LIBOR, 
WILMERHALE (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20190820-
prepare-your-business-for-the-end-of-LIBOR.
16. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 12.
17. Id.
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ments presents itself as a challenge as most contracts for these cash products did 
not envision the possibility that LIBOR would be phased out.18  The fallback 
language in these contracts is often absent, ambiguous, or fails to contemplate 
the permanent cessation of LIBOR.19 Determining what the fallback provision 
is (if any) for the scenario where LIBOR becomes available is necessary for 
strategy formation as different terms can be used in fallback language to replace 
rates such as: to utilize another index, to poll London or NYC banks, to obtain 
at least one LIBOR rate from a defined bank, obtain the vote of 100% of note-
holders, or to fix the transaction at the LIBOR rate at the time of deal closing 
instituting the last posted LIBOR as a new fixed rate.20 Firms should look to 
the exact language of the trigger, fallback, and any margin or spread contem-
plated for in fallback provisions of legacy contracts to determine whether the 
replacement rate contracted for is appropriate.
B.  What Type of Financial Product is Being Used?
LIBOR is most often associated with the derivates market and the current 
estimated volume of derivates based on US Dollar LIBOR is $199 trillion.21
However, USD LIBOR is also referenced in several trillion dollars of corporate 
loans, floating-rate mortgages, floating rate notes, and securitized products.22
The use of LIBOR across asset classes increases the complexity for financial 
institutions as the process for negotiations of a new term differs depending on 
whether the underlying financial instrument is a consumer, commercial, or in-
terbank loan.  It is certain that the gains and costs from investing in these differ-
ent financial instruments will shift as firms negotiate a replacement rate.23 How 
the risk is adjusted and what is expected from regulators during this transition 
process is not certain and differs depending on the specific instrument used.
C. What Process Can be Taken to Facilitate the Transition?
As a response to the LIBOR scandal in 2012, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York established the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) to 
consider the range of potential reference interest rates and identify a risk-free 
rate or rates to replace LIBOR that would represent best practices for use in new 
derivates and other contracts.24 The ARRC identified the Secured Overnight 
18. ALT. REFERENCE RATES COMM., SUMMARY OF ARRC’S LIBOR FALLBACK LANGUAGE
1 (2019) [hereinafter ARRC’S LIBOR FALLBACK LANGUAGE], https://www.newyorkfed.org
/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2019/LIBOR_Fallback_Language_Summary.
19. See SECOND ARRC REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
20. SFA, supra note 7, at 5.
21. SECOND ARRC REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
22. Id at 1.
23. Virji et al., supra note 3, at 719.
24. See generally SECOND ARRC REPORT, supra note 4.
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Financing Rate (SOFR) as the preferred alternative benchmark rate.25 On Sep-
tember 24, 2018, the ARRC released a report outlining its LIBOR fallback con-
sultation which laid out two alternative approaches for how institutions could 
best transition to an alternative reference rate: the “hardwired approach” and the 
“amendment” approach.26 Under the hardwired approach, the administrative
agent on its own or by request of the borrower notifies all parties to a loan 
agreement that a specific number of “currently outstanding U.S. dollar-
denominated syndicated credit facilities” have identified SOFR plus a spread 
risk adjustment as the replacement benchmark interest rate for contracts with 
LIBOR.27 After the parties have been notified, the borrowers and required 
lenders may elect by affirmative vote to replace LIBOR with the change going 
into effect on the first business day the administrative agent provides written 
notice to loan agreement parties that the Early Opt-in election has been made.28
Alternatively, under the amendment approach the language included in the loan 
documents provides a “triggering event” that the lender may amend the loan
document to substitute a replacement index, and will become effective on a 
specified date.29 The amendment approach is offered for loan products specifi-
cally as most loan agreements typically involve a known set of parties and can 
often be amended facilitating a streamlined amendment process to select a re-
placement rate and spread adjustment.30
D. What Substitute Language is Recommended for Commercial Products?
In November of 2019, the ARRC released a summary report of LIBOR 
fallback language that lays out its recommendations for triggers, benchmark re-
placement rates and relevant spread adjustment for the following commercial 
cash products: floating rate notes, bilateral business loans, syndicated loans, and 
securitizations.31
1.  Triggers
In regard to triggers, the ARRC recommends that it would be appropriate 
for any of these products to use either permanent cessation triggers or pre-
25. Id. at 6.
26. ALT. REFERENCE RATES COMM., ARRC RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MORE
ROBUST FALLBACK LANGUAGE FOR NEW ORIGINATIONS OF LIBOR SYNDICATED LOANS (2020) 
[hereinafter ARRC RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ROBUST FALLBACK LANGUAGE], 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2020/Updated-Final-
Recommended-Language-June-30-2020.pdf.
27. Id. at 2.
28. ARRC’S LIBOR FALLBACK LANGUAGE, supra note 18, at 5–6.
29. ARRC RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ROBUST FALLBACK LANGUAGE, supra note 26, 
at 9–12.
30. Id.
31. ARRC’S LIBOR FALLBACK LANGUAGE, supra note 18.
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cessation triggers.32 A permanent cessation trigger causes LIBOR to be re-
placed with the alternative benchmark rate when either the administrator or a 
regulator with authority over the administrator of the benchmark issues a state-
ment announcing that LIBOR will cease to be provided.33 A pre-cessation trig-
ger activates the switch from LIBOR to the alternative rate when a regulator
with authority over the administrator announces that the benchmark is “no long-
er representative.”34 For securitizations, the ARRC approves of a specific pre-
cessation trigger, the asset replacement percentage trigger, which designates 
that a percentage of underlying assets have been converted to the benchmark or 
replaced by assets bearing interest based on the benchmark replacement.35 As 
mentioned earlier, the ARRC has offered an alternative amendment approach 
for bilateral and syndicated business loans that would allow for an “early opt in”
pre-cessation trigger to be implemented which offers flexibility for the parties to 
decide which conditions would represent a triggering event.36
2.  Benchmark and Spread Adjustment
On April 8, 2020 the ARRC agreed on a recommended spread adjustment 
methodology for cash products referencing LIBOR.37 It recommends that the 
replacement benchmark rate for legacy contracts be SOFR plus a spread ad-
justment methodology based on a historical median over a five-year lookback 
period calculating the difference between USD LIBOR and SOFR.38 Lastly, the 
ARRC recommends that the selected spread adjustment be selected by the issu-
er or designee for floating rate notes, by the lender for bilateral business loans, 
by the borrower and admin agent for syndicated loans, and by designated trans-
actional representative for securitizations.39
E. What Substitute Language is Recommended for Consumer Cash Products?
Consumer products often involve a more sophisticated lender so there is a 
stronger need for plain contract language. Thus, for consumer cash products 
such as a closed-end adjustable rate mortgage, the ARRC recommends that the 
language uses either a permanent cessation or a non-representativeness pre-
cessation trigger, and that the replacement rate be SOFR plus a spread adjust-





37. ALT. REFERENCE RATES COMM., ARRC ANNOUNCES RECOMMENDATION OF A SPREAD 
ADJUSTMENT METHODOLOGY FOR CASH PRODUCTS (2020) [hereinafter ARRC’s
RECOMMENDATION OF A SPREAD ADJUSTMENT METHODOLOGY], https://www.newyorkfed.org
/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2020/ARRC_Spread_Adjustment_Methodology.pdf.
38. Id. at 1.
39. ARRC’S LIBOR FALLBACK LANGUAGE, supra note 18, at 6.
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ment risk using the same five-year lookback period methodology as the com-
mercial cash products.40 The ARRC also recommends a one-year transition pe-
riod to this five-year median spread adjustment in consumer products in re-
sponse to comments and concerns from consumer advocacy groups.41
F.  What Other Alternative Rates Might be Used Besides SOFR?
Although SOFR has been selected by the ARRC as LIBOR’s replacement, 
the use of SOFR as the alternative rate is not yet backed by any legal or regula-
tory mandate. Leaders of ten larger regional banks voiced their concerns about 
adopting SOFR through a letter written in September 2019.42 These leaders 
pointed to concerns that using SOFR as the rate during periods of significant 
economic stress would push borrowers’ rates lowers while banks’ cost of funds 
are rising as the SOFR will likely decrease when investors seek the safe haven 
of U.S. Treasury securities.43 This concern is playing out currently as COVID-
19 has caused extreme financial market turbulence and as a result the SOFR has 
moved sharply in the opposite direction of LIBOR.44 SOFR is still positioned 
to become the primary replacement rate benchmark for financial contracts in 
lieu of LIBOR, but the problems posed by the difference between SOFR and 
LIBOR, especially during an economic crisis, leave room for other potential in-
terest rates to be brought to negotiation.
Now, there is no longer a question as to whether LIBOR is being phased 
out.  Firms and financial institutions should already be preparing to implement 
an effective transition plan.  These project plans will be unique to each institu-
tion’s needs but a basic structure for any institution should: (1) identify any con-
tracts with language referenced to LIBOR; (2) categorize the contracts by type 
of financial instrument used; (3) analyze the contracts’ language to determine if 
it is a legacy contract with inadequate fallback provisions; (4) draft desired sub-
stitution language for any upcoming contract renegotiations using agency rec-
ommendations and industry standards as guides to facilitate smoother transition.
40. Id. at 7.
41. ARRC’s RECOMMENDATION OF A SPREAD ADJUSTMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 37.
42. Letter from R. Christopher Marshall Exec. Vice President & Treasurer, BBVA USA 
Bancshares, Inc.,et. al., to the Hon. Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chairman of Supervision, Bd. Of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. et al. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016d-
d15d-d0d8-af6d-f77d6c5f0001.
43. Id.
44. See Jeffrey Armstrong, Covid-19 Crisis Exposes LIBOR Replacement’s Weaknesses, 
LAW 360 (Mar. 27, 2020, 5:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1256813/covid-19-crisis-
exposes-LIBOR-replacement-s-weaknesses (“From March 12 through March 20, USD 3-month 
LIBOR rose a total of 46 basis points – nearly one-half a percent. Over that same time, 3-month 
SOFR declined by roughly 7.7 basis points.”).
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II. PREPARING FOR BATTLE: NEGOTIATIONS AND POTENTIAL 
LITIGATION CLAIMS
Part I of this paper illustrated some of the significant input provided by fi-
nancial regulators on procedures and alternative rates that could be chosen to 
help ensure market-participants successfully transition from LIBOR.  However, 
no mandatory governmental regulation currently exists that would require bor-
rowers or lenders to use a specific replacement rate for LIBOR in legacy con-
tracts.  Parties themselves must proactively and bilaterally agree to amend their 
existing contracts before December 2021, but the absence of direct regulatory 
pressure to renegotiate LIBOR-linked contracts may cause counterparties to 
drag their feet and be slow or reluctant to engage.45 COVID-19 also adds an-
other cause for parties, both in their ability to renegotiate and their willingness 
to focus on the issue of LIBOR-phaseout prioritizing other concerns.  However, 
COVID-19 can actually be an actor that speeds up this process as many market 
participants are already analyzing and reviewing contracts for force majeure
clause and doing client outreach.46 Firms and financial institutions should also 
take this as an opportunity to review for and discuss any LIBOR related issues 
when doing client outreach about COVID-19 concerns.
For institutions that have taken the steps to identify legacy contracts linked 
to LIBOR and created a plan of action with potential substitute language draft-
ed, the next step will be to begin the renegotiations.  The process of renegotia-
tions will likely be spearheaded by the financial institutions making offers, so it 
is important that counterparties be ready with their own calculations.  The next 
section of this note will attempt to use the implications of LIBOR risk identifi-
cation in Part I.  It will also create a general overview of different ways this re-
negotiation process will unfold over the next two years highlighting the result-
ing legal battles and litigation costs that will likely arise from the different 
scenarios.  Until any legislation is passed, this process can likely only end in 
two ways: consensual agreements or litigation.
A. The Contract Types
1.  The Good – A Legacy Contract with Clear Fallback Language
Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the legacy contracts identi-
fied by firms contain robust fallback language that offers an unambiguous and 
actionable path to the replacement rate of LIBOR.  Historically, fallback lan-
guage for the replacement of LIBOR did not contemplate the permanent discon-
tinuation of LIBOR, and as a result, there is uncertainty over contract interpreta-
45. DELOITTE U.K., supra note 6, at 7.
46. See Paul Rosen, What Happens with Contracts Amid the Covid-19 Pandemic, FORBES
(Mar. 26, 2020, 6:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulrosen/2020/03/26/what-happens-with-
contracts-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic/#1ad0b7e142af.
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tion.47 Yet, there are some existing contracts that do fit this category.  In the 
event that the fallback language included in the agreement contains: (1) a trig-
ger akin to “if the index no longer fits the agreed upon definition of being avail-
able,” (2) a benchmark replacement that reads similar to “the Note holder will 
use X replacement rate,”48 or (3) a benchmark replacement adjustment similar 
to “the Note holder will calculate the new interest by adding X percentage 
points to the index,” there is likely no room for the parties to renegotiate or rea-
sonably claim that the change of index contracted for use is a term that can or 
should be negotiated.  The clearly-defined trigger, the specified alternative rate, 
and the spread (if necessary) are all important factors for a firm to consider 
when evaluating a contract on its likelihood of attracting litigation.
2.  The Likely – Ambiguous or Silent Fallback Provisions
The ARRC’s second report stated that most legacy contracts referencing 
LIBOR do not have robust fallback language. “Large numbers of legacy con-
tracts provide for alternatives to LIBOR, but they were drafted in anticipa-
tion of the possibility of only a temporary, short-term interruption in 
LIBOR’s availability.”49 These provisions do not fully and precisely address 
issues that could be contentious. Competing contract interpretation arguments 
will be made to claim that the contractual provisions do not effectively address 
a permanent cessation of LIBOR.  Challenges as to the trigger (“What does ‘no 
longer available’ mean?”), challenges as to the fairness (“rate to be chosen by 
lender at a later date”), and challenges to the rate term itself (“Last-posted 
LIBOR”) all have defects that can give rise to arguments.50 These arguments
can either be answered in meeting rooms during negotiation talks or in courts 
during litigation, and it is up to the parties to decide how they plan to address 
any contract ambiguity.
B. The Contract “Solutions”
1.  Client Follow-up (Clear Fallback Language)
Arguments could possibly be made about the fairness of the new rate.  
However, principles of contract autonomy will likely override as long as the 
47. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 12.
48. This rate should be a fully alternative rate not mentioning or referencing LIBOR, such as 
“last-posted LIBOR,” as this specified rate can also lead to contract interpretation of the parties’
intention about a fixed or floating rate change. See SFA, supra note 7, at 5.
49. Howard Altarescu & Andrew Morris, LIBOR . . . Coming to an End?, JD SUPRA (Dec. 
20, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/LIBOR-coming-to-an-end-74602/.
50. See generally id.
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language contains clear and specified replacement rates.51 Client outreach 
should still be done to confirm that all relevant parties are aware of the upcom-
ing change in rate firstly to maintain good client relations and secondly to add 
an extra layer of mitigation against any potential future claims.52 Furthermore, 
this is a good time for firms to double-check that they are in compliance with 
any applicable banking, securities, and consumer protection laws that might be 
potential sources for other claims depending on the alternative rates fairness.
2.  Consensual Resolution (Battle in the Boardroom)
“The only way to avoid disputes under agreements that are long-term and 
fail to address the cessation of LIBOR as a possible eventuality is for parties to 
agree to a change in index and agree to compensation for losses that result from 
such a change.”53 Amendments to bi-lateral contracts will be a function of lev-
erage of each party, and firms and financial institutions should factor in the risk 
and cost of litigation when making any demands or concessions for the re-
placement rate.  Parties could potentially streamline amending a silent contract 
by agreeing to adopt the ARRC recommendations for the financial product un-
derlying the contract in dispute.  Whether parties choose to apply the hardwired 
approach, immediately replacing LIBOR with another rate, the amendment ap-
proach, altering the instruments to replace a fallback rate with another fallback 
rate that will come into effect with the trigger, the waterfall language provided 
by the ARRC will reduce the amount of outside research parties need to expend 
to come to this agreement.  Consensual agreements from all necessary parties 
result in successful contract amendment and continuation with the new agreed 
upon terms.54 The ARRC recommendations are not required for parties to reach 
a consensual resolution, but they do provide a readily available template for par-
ties that can save transactional costs spent on drafting and negotiating different 
terms.
Some contracts may have clauses, such as an amendment for bond issues, 
that require consent from many investors, causing difficulty for market partici-
pants amending legacy contracts. The battle in this scenario contains the trans-
actional risk of getting all the different parties to agree as well as an administra-
tive risk of needing a strong document review or IT system capable of 
identifying and tracking down all parties involved.55 Furthermore, there is the 
potential that when parties meet to discuss the change in the reference rate, one 
of the parties will use this as an opportunity to renegotiate a loan contract and 
51. See Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1529, 1530 (2002) (“Courts again refrain from challenging the substance of parties’ agreements, and 
interpretation again emphasizes the written language.”).
52. See Deloitte U.K., supra note 6, at. 7.
53. Virji et al., supra note 3, at 720.
54. Id.
55. See DELOITTE U.K., supra note 6, at 12–16.
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look to amend provisions that extend beyond just changing the reference rate.56
Market participants on both ends should be aware of the relevant accounting 
standards that could be compromised by this amendment because the contractu-
al change would be deemed a “substantial modification.”57 All parties should 
be aware that negotiations should be done with leverage, but both sides hold the 
leverage of not agreeing on amendments and threatening litigation.
3.  No Consensual Resolution (Battle in the Courts)
Although the templates and SOFR rate should be reliable alternatives that 
parties could agree on for consensual amendments, the plaintiffs’ bar will be 
looking for opportunities, particularly on a class-action basis, to argue that any 
coerced or non-consensual change disadvantages borrowers.58 Some of the 
claims that are expected from plaintiff’s will be an anticipatory breach or repu-
diation before LIBOR is extinguished.59 As a general rule, rescission of a con-
tract is permitted for such a breach which substantially defeats its purpose.60
Financial institutions should be on the lookout for developed case law that ad-
dresses whether courts find that an agreed upon reference rate is the ultimate 
reason that consumers choose to bind themselves to one contract over another.  
Thus, the intended change in rate is grounds for anticipatorily pulling out of the 
financial instrument.  Plaintiffs that do not like the rates offered to them by fi-
nancial institutions will likely seek the courts to find a more favorable rate and 
argue that the term rate is, or became, ambiguous.  If the plaintiff did not draft 
the original contract, they could argue that ambiguous rate terms should be in-
terpreted against the drafter and a rate most favorable to the plaintiff should be 
inserted as the replacement rate.
Other legal claims that plaintiffs might bring would be to seek to enforce 
that the contract be terminated under the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.61 This doctrine prevents one party from denying the other the benefit
of the contract, and an unfair rate that leads to no consensual agreement would 
be looked at to see if one party would be seizing an unanticipated windfall.62
Plaintiffs will likely also try to bring claims under force majeure clauses found 
within the contracts arguing that the change in the LIBOR rate represents an en-
gagement of this clause which triggers termination of the contract.63 Claims 
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id.
58. LIBOR Transition Newsletter – Issue 4: Litigation Risks – Outstanding Residential 
Mortgage Loans, GREENBERG TRAURIG: INSIGHTS (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.gtlaw.com/en
/insights/2020/4/LIBOR-transition-newsletter-issue-4.
59. See id.
60. Wiljeff, LLC v. United Realty Mgmt. Corp., 920 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) 
(quoting Lenel Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Smith, 824 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)).
61. See Altarescu & Morris, supra note 49.
62. See id.
63. Virji et al., supra note 3, at 719.
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could also be brought under unexpected-circumstances doctrines such as impos-
sibility, frustration of purpose, or mutual mistake of fact.64 Arguments could be 
brought that performance is impossible because LIBOR’s cessations represent 
an event that the “parties did not anticipate and is beyond their control,” or that 
the value of performance for the borrower has been destroyed and the allocated-
risk of the event of LIBOR’s cessation was not present at the time the contract 
was made.65 Financial institutions should pay attention to the court decisions 
on these claims and any respective risk this would have on the portfolio if it is 
found that plaintiffs are able to discharge their duty to pay.  Lastly, some parties 
may seek specific performance to use LIBOR as it existed at a particular point 
or an alternative rate that is not SOFR.66
Market participants likely to be on the defense of these claims, such as 
noteholders and servicers, should consider the strength of any legal defenses
they can make framed around lack of knowledge at the time of origination.67
Courts are hesitant to terminate contracts,68 and defendants could make argu-
ments based on mutual or unilateral mistake.69 They could also argue that the 
parties agreed to a variable rate tied to a third party, longstanding, industry-
accepted benchmark; therefore, it is more reasonable for the parties to adopt the 
new industry standard of SOFR plus a market spread adjustment laid out by the 
ARRC than it would be to terminate the contract altogether.70 Lastly, there is 
current New York legislation pending that could allow for defendants to argue 
that any pending litigation on the appropriateness of an anticipatory breach 
should be stayed until the legislature has had an opportunity to decide on the 
proposal.
4.  Government Regulation? (Wait and See Approach)
Lastly, firms and financial institutions that have the majority of their finan-
cial products governed under New York law could hold off on negotiations and 
wait until legislation is implemented to address LIBOR cessation in financial 
instruments and contracts. On March 6, 2020 the ARRC released its New York 
State legislative proposal for amending legacy contract that lack adequate 
fallback language.71 A substantial number of financial contracts referencing 
64. Altarescu & Morris, supra note 49.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. GREENBERG TRAURIG, supra note 58.
68. See Mariana Pargendler, The Role of the State in Contract Law: The Common-Civil Law 
Divide, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 143, 162 (2016) (“U.S. courts have been similarly reluctant in applying 
the doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Donna Parisi et. al, ARRC Releases NY Law Proposal to Amend Transactions Refer-
encing UDS LIBOR, SHEARMEN & STERLING PERSPECTIVES (Apr. 2020), 
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USD LIBOR are governed by New York law, and as exhibited by the prior two 
paragraphs the lack of legislative action will lead to an onslaught of litigation 
and increased risk from inconsistency in the financial instruments continuity.72
The legislation would set a market-wide standard for different contractual cir-
cumstances.  It has a mandatory and permissive application depending on the 
fallback language found in the original agreement.73 Initially, this proposed bill 
was intended to be folded into the New York State budget bill incorporated in 
the budget on April 1, but COVID-19 has delayed the timeline.74 However, I 
would not recommend this option because even this legislation will likely be 
challenged under U.S. constitutional law.75 Delaying the process to wait on a 
legislative fix instead of working to amend the contract now could put firms in a 
difficult position if any impending constitutional challenge is not resolved be-
fore 2021.
CONCLUSION
There is not a clear path for any financial institution save for the ones that 
had really good lawyers who perceived the threat of a reference rate phaseout 
and drafted the original agreements with clear fallback language.  It is known 
that LIBOR is ending by 2021, but what is unknown is how firms and financial 
institutions will choose to handle the necessary work that needs to be done by 
the end of next year.  A change in rate necessarily involves a change in valua-
tion, and market participants should factor in litigation risk and costs before 
making any decisions about how to handle the process.  The end of LIBOR 
brings about the potential beginnings of DEFCON 1 for financial contracts, so it 
is imperative that firms know now what they are going to choose: mutual 
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